Grand County v. Emery County, City of Green River  : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Grand County v. Emery County, City of Green
River : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Scott Barrett; Barrett and Daines; Attorneys for Appellee.
David A. Blackwell; Gerald H. Kinghorn; David J. Burns; Parsons, Davies Kinghorn and Peters;
Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Grand County v. Emery County, No. 20010044.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1731
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRAND COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
-vs-
EMERY COUNTY and the CITY OF 
GREEN RIVER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 20010044-SC 
CaseNos. 0007-103 and 0007-189 
[Consolidated] 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, HON. LYLE R. ANDERSON, DATED 
JANUARY 3,2001, GRANTING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
GRAND COUNTY THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-6, AS AMENDED BY 
HOUSE BILL 49, VIOLATES ARTICLE XI, SECTION 3 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
W. SCOTT BARRETT (#0228) 
Barrett & Daines 
108 North Main Street # 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4000 
Attorneys for Appellee Grand County 
DAVID A. BLACKWELL (#4542) 
90 East Main 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Telephone: (435) 381-2543 
Attorney for Appellant Emery County 
GERALD H. KINGHORN (#1825) 
DAVID J. BURNS (#7157) 
Parsons, Davies Kinghorn & Peters 
185 South State Street. Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Appellant City of Green River 
ED 
! IT AH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRAND COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
-vs-
EMERY COUNTY and the CITY OF 
GREEN RIVER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF, 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT < 
DISTRICT COURT, HON. LYL 
JANUARY 3,2001, GRANTING DECLAR 
GRAND COUNTY THAT UTAH CODE 
HOUSE BILL 49, VIOLATES AF 
THE UTAH CON! 
' — " 7 
 APPELLANTS 
OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
E R. ANDERSON, DATED 
ATORY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
ANN. § 17-2-6, AS AMENDED BY 
RTICLE XI, SECTION 3 OF 
STITUTION 
W. SCOTT BARRETT (#0228) 
Barrett & Daines 
108 North Main Street # 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-4000 
Attorneys for Appellee Grand County 
Supreme Court Case No. 20010044-SC 
CaseNos. 0007-103 and 0007-189 
[Consolidated] 
Priority No. 15 
DAVID A. BLACKWELL (#4542) 
90 East Main 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Telephone: (435) 381-2543 
Attorney for Appellant Emery County 
GERALD H. KINGHORN (#1825) 
DAVID J. BURNS (#7157) 
Parsons, Davies Kinghorn & Peters 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Appellant City of Green River 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
REPLY TO GRAND COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. The Legislature Is Not Required to Act by General Law in Connection 
with the First Step of the Annexation Procedure Because It Is Voter 
Approval and Not the Concurrent Resolution that Results in the Striking of 
Territory from any County 2 
A. Grand County's Focus on the Concurrent Resolution Is 
Contrary to the Applicable Law 2 
B. The Legislature May Act by Concurrent Resolution, or any 
Other Means of Acting Not Prohibited by the Utah Constitution 5 
C. Article XI, Sec. 3 Does Not Require the Legislature to Act by 
General Law when It Passes the Concurrent Resolution 
Pursuant to the Annexation Procedure 6 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Held That an Annexation Proposal Brought 
Under Section 17-2-6(2) Requires Approval by a Majority of Those 
Voters Living in the Territory to be Annexed 7 
A. Grand County's Resort to Extrinsic Evidence Is Improper 
Because the Voter Provision of the Annexation Statute Is 
Not Ambiguous 8 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Construed The Voter 
Approval Statute 10 
CONCLUSION 13 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 (Utah 1996) 8, 11 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935) 5 
Nowers v. Oakton 169 P. 2d 108 (1946) 11 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) 9 
Salt Lake City v. Tax Comm'n of State of Utah, 813 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1991) 6 
South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) 11 
State v. Beason, 2000 UT App 109, 2 P.3d 459 9 
Utah Farm Bureau Insur. Co. v. Utahlnsur. Guaranty Ass'n, 564P.2d751 (Utah 1977) 
3 
World Peace Movement of Am. V. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253 (Utah 1994) 
9 
Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-701 11 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-6 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-6 3-5,7-12 
Other Authorities 
1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 29.04-.08 (4th ed. 1985) 6 
iii' 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 22 6 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 24 5 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 6 
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26 6 
Utah Constitution, Article XI, Section 2 12 
Utah Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 3-6, 9, 12 
vi 
REPLY TO GRAND COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Grand County states it "generally agrees with Emery County-Green River factual 
statement," subject to "exceptions or additions." (Br. Appe. at 3.) This reply is limited to 
Grand County's few "exceptions or additions." Most of these "facts," however, are 
conclusory and unsupported by the record in these consolidated cases. 
1. It is true that Harvey W. Merrell provided an affidavit in support of Grand 
County's motion for preliminary injunction, wherein Mr. Merrell asserted he was not 
consulted and did not participate in the passage of H.B. 49. (Rl. 92-93.) However, Mr. 
Merrell acknowledges he became aware of H.B. 49 before its consideration by the Senate, 
and discussed it with "some legislators." (Rl. 93.) Further, Mr. Merrell's asserted lack of 
extensive involvement in the preparation of H.B. 49 does not negate the fact that other 
representatives of Grand County knew of it and were involved. Grand County had the means 
and opportunity to influence the proposed legislation. (Rl. 89.) It is disingenuous for it to 
contend it was blind-sided by H.B. 49. 
In truth, Grand County did not take the annexation proposal seriously until after 
the economic analysis was prepared, and it was at that time that it began objecting to the 
conclusions of the analysis and filed the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent the annexation proposal from being decided by the eligible voters. 
2. Grand County asserts that, "Prior to the election, all parties, including the Utah 
Lt. Governor, considered that a majority of registered voters (voters living in the area to be 
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annexed and the annexing county) would be required to pass the proposition." The record 
references do not support this assertion, however. Harvey Merrell claims in his affidavit that 
certain unidentified persons told him the election would be measured on the basis of the 
"registered voters." (R1.123.) This claim is hearsay. Further, the Lieutenant Governor did 
not certify to the Governor the results of the annexation proposal for the reason maintained 
by Grand County. Rather, the Lieutenant Governor did not certify the results to the Governor 
merely because the Grand County Election Official and the Board of Canvassers for Grand 
County did not certify to the Lieutenant Governor that the required majority of voters living 
within the territory to be annexed had voted in favor of annexation. Neither in her Answer 
(R2. 58) nor Affidavit (R2. 64) does the Lieutenant Governor express her opinion on the 
interpretation of the voter approval statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Legislature is Not Required to Act by General Law in Connection with the 
First Step of The Annexation Procedure Because It Is Voter Approval and Not 
The Concurrent Resolution that Results in the Striking of Territory from Any 
County. 
A. Grand County's Focus on the Concurrent Resolution Is Contrary to the 
Applicable Law. 
Grand County offers no response to Emery County and the City of Green River's 
showing that the underlying statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is 
a validly enacted general law. (See Br. App. at 21-28.) Instead, Grand County argues that, 
within the annexation procedure established by H.B. 49, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-
2 
6(2)(a)(ii)-which calls for passage of a concurrent resolution by each house of the 
Legislature—violates art. XI, sec. 3 of the Utah Constitution. (Br. Appe. at 6-8.) 
Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution as being determinative 
of whether H.B. 49 is a general law clashes with Emery County and the City of Green River's 
focus on passage of H.B. 49 as being determinative of whether H.B. 49 is a general law. 
This difference in focus lies at the core of the dispute in this appeal. 
Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution is flawed for several 
reasons. First, by its plain terms, art. XI, sec. 3 does not require every legislative act 
concerning an annexation proposal to be a general law. Rather, the Constitution requires any 
legislative act prescribing the "conditions" by which territory may be stricken from any 
county to be a general law. Thus, art. XI, sec. 3 speaks to the requirements of the underlying 
annexation statute, which in this instance is H.B. 49 and not the concurrent resolution which 
was passed pursuant to that statute. 
Second, Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution is contrary to 
the law applicable to evaluating challenged legislation under the "general law" provisions 
of the Utah Constitution. The test there is whether the legislative classification is reasonable 
in light of the purpose of the act. See Utah Farm Bureau Insur. Co. v. Utah Insur. Guaranty 
Ass% 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
Passage of the concurrent resolution bears no relation to the definition of the 
legislative classification. The statute creates a class consisting of cities/towns and counties 
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where the boundaries of the cities/towns cross county lines. See U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i)(A-
C). There are currently five sets of cities/towns and counties that fall within this 
classification. (See Affidavit of Finch Bingham, which is attached as Exhibit "G" to the 
Principal Brief of Appellants.) Because the concurrent resolution does not define the 
members of the class, it is irrelevant to the question of whether H.B. 49 is a general law. 
Finally, Grand County's focus is flawed because it incorrectly assumes passage of the 
concurrent resolution determines annexation. ("Control is therefore vested in the Legislature 
and not in Article XI, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Appe. at 6.) The trial court 
based its ruling on the same faulty assumption. ("Giving the Legislature and the Governor 
the last word on any county boundary change is something expressly prohibited by Utah's 
Constitution." Rl. 134.) 
In fact, however, H.B. 49 does not grant the Legislature "control" or "the last word" 
on whether an annexation proposal is approved. Passage of the concurrent resolution is 
merely one of three conditions that must be satisfied before an annexation proposal may be 
presented to eligible voters for approval. H.B. 49 calls for approval by the Legislature and 
Governor of the proposal before the matter may, after a satisfactory economic analysis, be 
submitted to voters for approval. See U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i-iv). But for the conditions of 
a satisfactory economic analysis and voter approval, there can be no annexation. 
H.B. 49 clearly contemplates that voter approval is the key determinant when it states 
the annexation "is approved" by a majority of the voters living in the area to be annexed and 
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the annexing county. U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). The requirement of voter approval 
is mandated by article XI, sec. 3, and is a part of the procedure enacted by H.B. 49. See 
U.C.A. §§ 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)and 17-2-6(2)(b)(iii)(C). 
Thus, Grand County incorrectly asserts the Legislature determines an annexation 
proposal. Passage of the concurrent resolution is merely the first step among four steps that 
must be satisfied before an annexation proposal may be certified as approved. It is in fact 
the affected voters who determine annexation. 
B. The Legislature May Act by Concurrent Resolution, or Any Other Means 
of Acting Not Prohibited by the Utah Constitution, 
Grand County responds that "Utah has no constitutional provision permitting the 
Legislature to exercise Legislative power by Joint Resolution." (Br. App. at 6.) The absence 
of express authority is unavailing to Grand County, however. 
The question is not whether the Utah Constitution expressly authorizes the Legislature 
to act by resolution, but rather whether the Constitution proscribes such means of acting. The 
Legislature may exercise all legislative power of the state except as limited by the state and 
federal constitutions. Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 534 (Utah 1935). Grand County 
does not point to express or implied language in the Utah Constitution proscribing the 
Legislature from acting by resolution. To the contrary, the Constitution expressly 
contemplates legislative action by resolution. Art. VI, sec. 24 generally requires the 
presiding officer of each house to sign "all bills and joint resolutions passed by the 
Legislature,.. ." 
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The implication of Grand County's contention is that the Constitution contemplates 
only one means of acting, namely, passage of a law. This contention is negated by the plain 
terms of the Constitution. For instance, whereas art. VI, sec. 22 sets forth procedures for the 
passage of "every bill," art. VI, sec. 25 requires "all acts" of the Legislature to be officially 
published. Similarly, no private or special "law" shall be enacted where a general "law" can 
be applicable. Utah Const, art. VI, sec. 26. 
Nor has this Court ever declared that passage of a legislative resolution creates a per 
se violation of the Utah Constitution. Rather, this Court has merely held that a resolution of 
the Utah Legislature is not legislation, and does not have the force or effect of law. See Salt 
Lake City v. Tax Comrn'n of State of Utah, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991) (citing 1A 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 29.04-.08 (4th ed. 1985)). Grand County agrees that 
a legislative resolution "is not a law." (Br. Appe. at 5.) 
Accordingly, because the Utah Constitution recognizes resolutions as a valid means 
of exercising the legislative power, such resolutions cannot be attacked as per se violations 
of the Constitution. 
C. Article XI, sec. 3 Does Not Require the Legislature to Act by General Law 
When It Passes the Concurrent Resolution Pursuant to the Annexation 
Procedure. 
Grand County contends the Legislature must act by general law whenever it adopts 
a concurrent resolution as part of the annexation procedure set forth in H.B. 49. (Br. Appe. 
at 6-8.) It refers to art. XI, sec. 3 for this purported proposition. Article XI, sec. 3 states: 
6 
No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a majority of the 
voters living in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is 
annexed, shall vote therefor, and then only under such conditions as 
may be prescribed by general law. 
Accordingly, the Utah Constitution does not require the Legislature to act by general 
l^w when so acting does not result in the striking of territory from a county. It requires only 
that any law prescribing the conditions for striking territory must assume the form of a 
general law. 
As shown above, passage of the concurrent resolution pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 17-2-6(2)(a)(l)(ii) does not result in the striking of territory from a county. Instead, it 
results merely in the preparation of an economic analysis. As such, Grand County incorrectly 
asserts that the concurrent resolution must be a general law. 
To summarize, Grand County does not dispute the underlying statute, H.B. 49, is a 
valid general law. Because its and the trial court's exclusive focus on passage of the 
concurrent resolution is flawed, the trial court should be reversed on the constitutionality of 
H.B. 49. 
IJL The Trial Court Correctly Held That an Annexation Proposal Brought Under 
Section 17-2-6(2) Requires Approval by A Majority of Those Voters Living in 
The Territory to be Annexed. 
Grand County cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that the annexation statute's 
provision for voter approval on the basis of a "majority of voters living in the area proposed 
for annexation" limits the franchise to those persons who live in the area to be annexed and 
who actually vote on the annexation proposal. (Br. Appe. at 9-10.) 
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In its ruling, the trial court stated: 
The statute in question authorizes a change in the county 
boundary if, among other things, the change is approved by a "majority 
of voters living in the area proposed for annexation." "Voter" can 
mean either a person who actually votes or a person who is legally 
entitled to vote. Grand County contends that the addition of the words 
"living in the area" suggests an intent to include in the group from 
which a majority must be drawn every person "living in the area" who 
could vote. Emery County and Green River contend that the legislature 
used those words simply to narrow and define the universe of voters 
from which a majority must be drawn. 
The court agrees with Emery County and Green River. The use 
of "living in the area" acts to limit the franchise to those who live in the 
area proposed for annexation. It would be a simple matter for the 
legislature, if it so desired, to state that the proposal must be atpproved 
by a majority of all persons living in the affected area who did or could 
vote. Alternately, it could have used the language interpreted in City 
of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 (Utah ] 996), "a 
majority of registered voters." 
The court concludes the plain meaning of the word "voters" in 
this statute is people who actually vote. The court accordingly 
determines that the proposal did receive the required electoral approval. 
[Rl. 131-32.] 
A. Grand County's Resort to Extrinsic Evidence Is Improper Because the 
Voter Provision of the Annexation Statute Is Not Ambiguous. 
Under H.B. 49, after the completion of a satisfactory economic analysis, the 
annexation is approved by "a majority of the voters living in the area proposed to be 
annexed", and "a majority of the voters living in the proposed annexing county." U.C.A. § 
17~2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). Grand County contends the meaning of this voter approval statute 
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should be determined from "the roll of registered voters" within the territory to be annexed 
and the annexing county. (Br. Appe. at 10.) 
In support of its construction of the voter approval statute, Grand County refers to a 
non-enrolled draft of H.B. 49, the purported understanding of "all parties, including the 
County Clerks, and Lt. Governor," the language of Section 17-2-8, as amended by H.B. 49, 
and art. XI, sec. 3 of the Utah Constitution. (Br. Appe. At 9-10.) In other words, to interpret 
Section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B), Grand County resorts to factors other than the statute itself. 
Grand County's proposed construction is improper as a matter of law. It is well 
established that, faced with a question of statutory construction, this Court first examines the 
plain language of the statute. See Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257, 
259 (Utah 1998). The Court will not look beyond the plain language unless it finds the 
statute is ambiguous. Id. See also, World Peace Movement of Am. V. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) ("only when we find ambiguity in the statute's 
language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations."). Grand County does not allege, much less show, that Section 17-2-
6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) contains an ambiguity. As such, it may not resort to the extrinsic evidence 
described above. 
In fact, the statute is not ambiguous on its face. The relevant language, "majority of 
the voters," "living in the area proposed to be annexed", and "living in the proposed 
annexing county," is not susceptible to different meanings. See State v. Beason, 2000 UT 
9 
App 109, Tf 19,2 P.3d 459,463. Indeed, Grand County offers no alternative construction of 
Section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) on the basis of its plain language (and without resort to 
extrinsic evidence). Accordingly, it must be presumed Grand County does not contend the 
plain language is susceptible to different meanings. 
Because Grand County does not show the statute is ambiguous, it may not resort to 
extrinsic evidence in support of its construction of the statute. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Construed the Voter Approval Statute. 
The annexation statute is clear and uses the term "majority of voters living in the area 
proposed for annexation" to describe the voters who are entitled to vote for or against the 
proposition. SeeU.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). Black's Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines 
the term "voter", in pertinent part, as follows: 
Voter. The word has two meanings - a person who performs act 
of voting, and a person who has the qualifications entitling him 
to vote . . . . 
Thus, the term "voter" simply means an individual residing in the City of Green River in 
Grand County who voted in the annexation election. 
Pursuant to the statute's express terms, only the voters living in the area to be annexed 
could vote in the election. Accordingly, the Grand County election judges permitted only 
persons residing in the City of Green River to vote in the annexation proposition election. 
Of these eligible voters, 35 voters voted in favor of the proposition and 17 voters voted 
against it. (Rl. 132; R2. 4.) Grand County does not dispute this conclusion. 
10 
Grand County's assertion that the number of "yes" votes on the proposition must be 
measured against the total number of "registered voters" in the Green River City precinct 
of Grand County is precluded by the plain language of the statute. Nowhere does Section 17-
2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) ever refer to the eligible voters as "registered voters." 
This Court has been careful to literally construe statutory election language. Thus, in 
the absence of a specific requirement that the vote be measured on the basis of the 
"registered voters," such a requirement will not be read into an election statute. See, e.g., 
South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) (municipal dissolutions under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-701); City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 
(Utah 1996) (township elections under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502). 
In Nowers v. Oakton 169 P. 2d 108 (1946), this Court construed the term " a vote by 
the majority of all the legal voters of such county..." to require only a majority vote of voters 
voting in the election. The construction of the election statute at issue in Nowers is identical 
to the construction Emery County and the City of Green River place on Section 17-2-
6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). 
Using the voter registration list to arrive at the number of eligible voters would 
impose an artificially high standard on the measurement of the election because a large 
number of "registered voters" do not reside in the area to be annexed. 
Filed along with Emery County and the City of Green River's Petition for Election 
Review are affidavits executed by Grand County election judges who state that twenty 
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persons on the voter registration roll did not reside in the area to be annexed at the time of 
the election. (R2. 37-42.) Additionally, affidavits were provided from sixteen former 
residents of the area who no longer reside in the area to be annexed, and two persons who 
are listed on the Green River Precinct Voter Registration list who have never lived in the City 
of Green River. (R2. 19-36.) When H.B. 49 was enacted the Legislature undoubtedly was 
aware of the inherent inaccuracy of voter registration lists. 
Consequently, separate from the lack of statutory authority, Grand County's suggested 
construction of the voter approval statute is problematic. It presents serious obstacles to a 
fair and effective measurement of the election results since a person could be listed as a 
registered voter in an area to be annexed where he or she does not reside. As shown above, 
persons are often registered to vote in a precinct where they do not reside. 
Article XI, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution employ different language to 
describe eligible voters. Article XI, sec. 2 defines the number of voters required to approve 
a change in county from one place to another as follows: ". . . two thirds of the qualified 
electors." This is to be contrasted with the succeeding section where a super majority is not 
intended to be required. Article XI, sec. 3 defines the number of voters required to change 
county boundaries as follows: "a majority of the voters living in such territory." Section 17-
2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) uses the same language as article XI, sec. 3, namely, a "majority of the 
voters." If the Legislature intended a super majority requirement, it would have specified it. 
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Accordingly, the trial court's ruling with respect to the construction of the voter 
approval statute should be affirmed. Grand County's cross-appeal should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Emery County and the City of Green River respectfully 
request that the trial court's ruling that H.B. 49 is unconstitutional be reversed, and the matter 
be remanded for the entry of appropriate orders certifying the results of the election on the 
annexation proposal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of June, 2001. 
DAVID A. BLACKWELL 0 
Attorney for Appellant Emery County 
PARSON^r^AVffiS, KINGHORN & PETERS 
GERAfSimrNGHORN 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorneys for Appellant the City of Green River 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 4th day of June 2001
 ? the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was served by mailing a copy thereof by first-class 
United States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
W. Scott Barrett 
Barrett & Daines 
108 North Main Street, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
8004 14 
F,\DATA\djb\Files\Green River\Supreme Ct P\Bnef of Appellants 
14 
